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POINT PROCESS BRIDGES AND WEAK CONVERGENCE OF INSIDER
TRADING MODELS
UMUT C¸ETIN AND HAO XING
Abstract. We construct explicitly a bridge process whose distribution, in its own filtration, is
the same as the difference of two independent Poisson processes with the same intensity and its
time 1 value satisfies a specific constraint. This construction allows us to show the existence of
Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium and its associated optimal trading strategy for the insider. In the
equilibrium the insider employs a mixed strategy to randomly submit two types of orders: one
type trades in the same direction as noise trades while the other cancels some of the noise trades
by submitting opposite orders when noise trades arrive. The construction also allows us to prove
that Glosten-Milgrom equilibria converge weakly to Kyle-Back equilibrium, without the additional
assumptions imposed in K. Back and S. Baruch, Econometrica, 72 (2004), pp. 433-465, when the
common intensity of the Poisson processes tends to infinity.
1. Introduction
In this paper we perform an explicit construction of a particular bridge process associated to
a point process that arises in the solution of Glosten-Milgrom type insider trading models from
Market Microstructure Theory. Our starting point is the work of Back and Baruch [4] who studies
a class of equilibrium models of insider trading (of Glosten-Milgrom type) and their convergence to
Kyle model.
In Glosten-Milgrom type insider trading models, there exists an insider who possesses the knowl-
edge of the time 1 value of the asset given by the random variable v˜. There is also another class
of traders, collectively known as noise traders, who trade without this insider knowledge. Their
trades are of the same size and arrive at Poisson times which are assumed to be independent of v˜.
The insider trades using her extra information in order to maximise her expected wealth at time 1
but taking into account that her trades move the prices to her disadvantage since the price is an
increasing function of the total demand for the asset. Moreover, in order to hide her trades, and
thus her private information, she will also submit orders that are of the same size as noise trades.
The price of the asset in this market is determined by a market maker in the equilibrium whose
precise definition is given in Section 2.
In the specific model that we will study (and also studied in [4]) v˜ takes values in {0, 1}. Since the
noise buy and sell orders arrive at Poisson times and are of the same size, the net Z of cumulative
buy and sell noise trades, after normalization, is given by the difference of two independent Poisson
processes. Writing Y = Z + X for the total demand for the asset, where X denotes the trading
strategy of the insider, we will see in Theorem 3.4 that a Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium exists if
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(i) Y in its own filtration has the same distribution as Z,
(ii) [Y1 ≥ y] = [v˜ = 1] almost surely for some y to be determined.
The second condition above implies that in the equilibrium the insider drives the process Y so
that the event whether Y1 is larger than y is predetermined at time 0 from the point of view of
the insider, since the set [v˜ = 1] is at the disposal of the insider already at time 0. Given this
characteristic of Y , it can be called (with a slight abuse of terminology) a point process bridge.
In Section 4, we explicitly construct a pure jump process X whose jump size is the same as that
of Z and Y = X +Z satisfies aforementioned conditions. From the point of view of filtering theory
X can be considered as the unobserved ‘drift’ added to the martingale Z. The specific choice of X
used in the bridge construction ensures that this drift disappears when we consider Y in its own
filtration.
To the best of our knowledge such a bridge construction has not been studied in the literature
before. On the other hand, the analogy with the enlargement of filtration theory for Brownian
motion is obvious. Indeed, if Z is instead a Brownian motion and we consider the problem of
finding a stochastic process X so that Y = Z +X is a Brownian motion in its own filtration and
[v˜ = 1] = [Y1 ≥ y] almost surely for some y ∈ R to be determined, the solution follows easily from the
enlargement of filtration theory. The recipe is the following: Find the Doob-Meyer decomposition
of Z when its natural filtration is initially enlarged with the random variable [Z1 ≥ y]. Then, in
the finite variation part of this decomposition, replace Z with Y and [Z1 ≥ y] with [v˜ = 1] to find
X. This recipe gives
(1.1) X = I[v˜=1]
∫ ·
0
∂y log p
0(Ys, s) ds + I[v˜=0]
∫ ·
0
∂y log(1− p
0(Ys, s)) ds,
where p0 is the function given in (5.1). From the insider trading point of view, X defined by (1.1)
is the insider’s optimal trading strategy in a Kyle model, see Remark 5.2 in this respect. The
counterpart of these arguments in the theory of enlargement of filtrations for jump processes also
exists in the literature, see [13].
Yet the above recipe does not work when Z is the difference of independent Poisson processes.
The problem is that the enlargement of filtration technique gives us the decomposition of Z as a sum
of a martingale and an absolutely continuous process. This is clearly not useful for the construction
that we are after, since we want to write Y as sum of Z and X which changes only by jumps. The
desired jump process X is constructed explicitly in Section 4 using [v˜ = 1] and a sequences of iid
uniformly distributed random variables independent of everything else. This amounts to say that
the insider uses her private information and some additional randomness from uniformly distributed
random variables to construct her optimal strategy. Moreover, we will see in Section 5 that, after an
appropriate rescaling, these jump processes converge weakly to X given by (1.1) as the intensity of
the Poisson processes that constitute Z increases to infinity. Note the process X given in (1.1) does
not need any extra randomness other than the set [v˜ = 1]. This brings fore the question whether
the bridge process defined in Section 4 can alternatively be constructed without the aid of the extra
randomness. We believe this would be a quite interesting avenue for further research.
The construction of the point process bridge Y allows us to prove the existence of Glosten-
Milgrom equilibrium (see Theorem 5.1) which was demonstrated in [4] via a numeric computation.
In such an equilibrium the insider uses a mixed strategy to randomly submit two types of orders:
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one type trades in the same direction as noise trades while the other cancels noise trades by submit-
ting opposite orders when noise trades arrive. Observing noise trades, the insider uses the uniformly
distributed random variables to construct her strategy inductively. On the other hand, the con-
struction of Y invites a natural application of weak convergence theory to show Glosten-Milgrom
equilibria converge weakly to Kyle equilibrium when the intensity of Z increases to infinity. This
convergence was first proved in [4] under strong assumption on the convergence of value functions.
Utilising the theory of weak convergence, we are able to prove the result of Back and Baruch on
convergence without the additional assumptions; see Theorem 5.3.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we describe the Glosten-Milgrom
model and characterise its equilibrium which is the motivation of this paper. Section 4 discusses
the construction of the aforementioned point process bridge. In Section 5 we apply the results of
Section 4 to show the existence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria and discuss their weak convergence.
2. The model
We consider a market in continuous-time for a risky asset whose fundamental value is given by
v˜. The investors in this market can also trade a riskless asset at an interest rate normalised to
0 for simplicity. Following [4] we assume that v˜ has two states: high and low, which correspond
to two numeric representations respectively, 1 and 0. This fundamental value will be revealed to
the market participants at time 1 at which point we assume the market for the risky asset will
terminate1.
The microstructure of the market, and the interaction of market participants, is modelled simi-
larly as in [4]. There are three types of agents: noisy/liquidity traders, an informed trader (insider),
and a market maker, all of whom are risk neutral. All the processes and random variables in this
section are defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P) satisfying the usual conditions.
We assume that v˜ is indeed random, i.e. P(v˜ = 0) ∈ (0, 1).
• Noisy/liquidity traders trade for liquidity reasons, and their total demand is given by the
difference of two pure jump processes ZB and ZS, which represent their cumulative buy
and sell orders, respectively. As such, the net order flow of the noise traders are given by
Z := ZB − ZS. Noise traders only submit orders of fixed size δ every time they trade.
As in [4], ZB/δ and ZS/δ are assumed to be independent Poisson processes with constant
intensity β. Moreover, they are independent of v˜.
• The informed trader observes the market price process and is given the value of v˜ at time
0. The net order of the insider is denoted by X := XB −XS where XB (resp. XS) denotes
the cumulative buy (resp. sell) orders of the insider.
• A competitive market maker observes only the total net demand process Yt = Xt + Zt
and sets the price based solely on this information. This in particular implies that the
market maker’s filtration is (FYt ), the minimal filtration generated by Y satisfying the usual
conditions. We assume that the market maker is risk neutral and, thus, the competitiveness
means that he sets the price at E[v˜|FYt ] in the equilibrium.
1[4] assumes that the market has a random horizon defined by an independent exponential random variable.
However, one can see that this distinction is not relevant by comparing our results to those of Back and Baruch.
4 POINT PROCESS BRIDGES AND WEAK CONVERGENCE OF INSIDER TRADING MODELS
Although the noise traders trade for liquidity reasons exogenous to this model, the insider has
the objective to maximise her expected profit out of trading. This strategic behaviour of the insider
and the pricing mechanism set by the market maker as described above results in the price being
determined in an equilibrium. In order to define precisely what we mean by an equilibrium between
the market maker and the insider, we first need to establish the class of admissible actions available
to both.
Definition 2.1. A function p : δZ× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a pricing rule if
i) y 7→ p(y, t) is strictly increasing for each t ∈ [0, 1);
ii) t 7→ p(y, t) is continuously differentiable for each y ∈ δZ.
This Markov assumption on the pricing functional is standard in the literature (see, e.g., [2], [6]
or [8]). Given the pricing rule, the market maker sets the price to be p(Yt, t). It would be irrational
for the market maker to price the asset at some value larger than 1 or less than 0 since everybody
knows that the true value of the asset is 0 or 1. As we mentioned above the market maker is
competitive so that in equilibrium the price equals E[v˜ | FYt ]. Hence, p is typically [0, 1]-valued.
The monotonicity of p(·, t) implies that an increase in demand has a positive feedback on the asset
price. Moreover, this leads the insider to fully observe the noise trades, Z, by simply inverting
the price process and subtracting her own trades from it. Consequently, the insider’s filtration,
denoted with FI , contains the filtration generated by Z and v˜. We shall assume FI satisfies the
usual conditions. However, we refrain from setting FI equal to the filtration generated by Z and
initially enlarged with v˜ since we will only be able to show the existence of equilibrium if the insider
also possess a sequence of independent random variables, which she will use in order to construct
her mixed strategy. Admissible strategy of the insider is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. The strategy (XB ,XS ;FI) is admissible, if
i) FI is a filtration satisfying the usual conditions such that FIt = σ(v,F
Z
t ,Ht), where H is a
filtration independent of v and FZ .
ii) XB and XS , with XB0 = X
S
0 = 0, are F
I -adapted and integrable2 increasing point processes
with jump size δ;
iii) the (FI ,P)-dual predictable projections3 of XB and XS are absolutely continuous functions
of time.
The first assumption on FI makes the insider’s filtration part of the equilibrium. This is to allow
mixed strategies which will be determined in equilibrium. Note that the additional information can
only come from a source that is independent of Z. This implies in particular that the insider does
not have any extra information about the future demand of the noise traders. Although we allow
this additional source of information to vary in time, in the form of filtration H, in the equilibrium
that we will compute, Ht = H0 for all t ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that the insider can only trade δ-shares of the asset in every trade like the noise
traders. This is one of the underlying assumptions of the Glosten-Milgrom model, which we keep
2That is, E[XB1 ] and E[X
S
1 ] are both finite.
3These are simply the predictable compensators of the increasing processes XB and XS . See, e.g. [11] for a precise
definition.
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in this paper as well. One intuitive reason for this is that a rational insider will never submit an
order of a different size, since this will immediately reveal her identity and make, at least a part
of, her private information public causing to lose her comparative advantage. Moreover, in order
to make this argument rigorous one needs to make assumptions on the pricing rule as to how to
handle the orders of sizes which are multiples of δ. One can do the pricing uniformly, i.e. every
little bit of the order is priced the same, or different parts of the order is priced differently as one
walks up or down in an order book (see [5] for a discussion of such issues). However, this requires
different techniques for the analysis of optimal strategies given this complicated nature of pricing;
thus, we leave such analysis to a future investigation.
The third assumption on the dual predictable projections implies that XB and XS admit FI -
intensities θB and θS such that XB−
∫ ·
0 θ
B
s ds andX
S−
∫ ·
0 θ
S
s ds are F
I -martingales (see [12, Chapter
1, Theorem 3.15]). This assumption is technical and to ensure tractability.
Given that the insider submits orders of size δ and the assumption that the market maker observes
only the net demand yield that when the insider submits an order at the same when an uninformed
order arrives but in the opposite direction, i.e. a trade between the informed and uninformed occurs
without a need for a market maker, this transaction goes unnoticed by the market maker. Thus,
what we are affectively assuming is that the marke maker only becomes aware of the transaction
when there is a need for him. The assumption that the market maker only observes the net demand
is a common assumption in market microstructure literature. In particular, it is always assumed
in Kyle type models (see, e.g. [3]). Henceforth, when the insider makes a trade at the same with
an uninformed trader but in an opposite direction, we will say that the insider cancels the noise
trades.
Although we allow the insider to trade at the same time with the noise traders in the same
direction, we will see that in the equilibrium the insider will not carry such trades. This is intuitive.
does not trade in the same direction at the same time as the uniformed trades, but she does
randomly cancel part of uninformed orders. Both actions are required to hide her identity from the
market maker. Indeed, when two buy orders arrive at the same time the market maker will know
that one of them is an informed trade. Therefore it would be to the advantage of the insider to hide
her trades by submitting randomly, but of the same size, among the uninformed trades. On the
other hand, since the market maker is not aware of the transactions which consist in canceling noise
trades, submitting an order at the same time with the noise traders but in the opposite direction is
not necessarily suboptimal. We will in fact see that the insider does randomly cancel some trades
that are placed by the noise traders in the equilibrium.
As discussed in the last paragraphs, the insider’s buy orders XB consist of three components: we
denote by XB,B the cumulative buy orders which arrive at different time than those of ZB, by XB,T
the cumulative buy orders which arrive at the same time as some orders of ZB, and by XB,S the
cumulative buy orders which cancel some sell orders of ZS. As such, the jump time of XB,T (resp.
XB,S) are contained in the set of jump times of ZB (resp. ZS). Sell orders XS,S,XS,T , and XS,B
are defined analogously. Therefore XB = XB,B +XB,T +XB,S and XS = XS,S +XS,T +XS,B.
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As mentioned earlier, the insider aims to maximise her expected profit. Given an admissible
trading strategy (XB ,XS) the associated profit at time 1 of the insider is given by∫ 1
0
Xt− dp(Yt, t) + (v˜ − p(Y1, 1))X1.
The last term appears due to a potential discrepancy between the market price and the liquidation
value. Since X is of finite variation, an application of integration by parts rewrites the above as∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dX
B
t −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dX
S
t
=
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + δ, t)) dX
B,B
t +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + 2δ, t)) dX
B,T
t +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dX
B,S
t
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − δ, t)) dX
S,S
t −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − 2δ, t)) dX
S,T
t −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dX
S,B
t ,
where the last line is due to the fact that Y increases by δ when XB,B jumps, increases by 2δ
when XB,T jumps, and is unchanged when XB,S and ZS jump at the same time but different
directions. Similar situation goes for negative jumps of Y . As seen from the above formula, the
profit is zero when the insider place two opposite orders as the same time, we then assume without
loss of generality that insider does not do so.
Let’s define
a(y, t) := p(y + δ, t) and b(y, t) = p(y − δ, t).
Then, the expected profit of the insider conditional on her information equals
EP
[∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt−, t)) dX
B,B
t +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt− + δ, t)) dX
B,T
t +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dX
B,S
t
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Yt−, t)) dX
S,S
t −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − δ, t)) dX
S,T
t −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXS,B
∣∣∣∣ v˜] .
(2.1)
Note that the assumption E[XB1 ] < ∞ implies E[X
B
1 |v˜] < ∞ as well since E[X
B
1 ] = E[X
B
1 |v˜ =
1]P[v˜ = 1] + E[XB1 |v˜ = 0]P[v˜ = 0], and P[v˜ = 0] ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, E[X
S
1 |v˜] < ∞, too. Thus,
the above expectation will be finite as soon as we assume that the pricing rule is rational in the
sense that it assigns a price to the asset between 0 and 1. This will be part of the definition of
equilibrium, which will be made precise below. As seen from the above formulation, when price
moves, one buys (resp. sells) at a price a(y, t) (resp. b(y, t)), where y is the cumulative order right
before such trade. Thus, a(y, t) (resp. b(y, t)) can be viewed as the ask (resp. bid) price.
Our goal is to find an equilibrium between the market maker and the insider in the following
fashion:
Definition 2.3. A Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium is a quadruplet (p,XB ,XS ,FI) such that
i) given (XB ,XS ;FI), p is a rational pricing rule, i.e., p(Yt, t) = E[v˜ | F
Y
t ] for t ∈ [0, 1];
ii) given p, (XB ,XS ;FI) is an admissible strategy maximising (2.1).
Recall that v˜ takes only two values by assumption. In view of this specification we will often call
the insider in the sequel of high type when v˜ = 1 and low type when v˜ = 0.
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3. Characterisation of equilibrium
Before we give a characterisation of equilibrium, we will provide some heuristics. Due to the
Markov structure of the pricing rule, we will define the informed trader’s value function and derive,
via a heuristic argument, the associated HJB equation. Definition 2.2 ii) implies that the FI -dual
predictable projection of Xi,j , i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,S, T}, is of the form δ
∫ ·
0 θ
i,j
s ds so that
Xi,j − δ
∫ ·
0 θ
i,j
s ds defines an FI -martingale. Observe that since the set of jumps times of XB,S
and XS,T (resp. XS,B and XB,T ) is contained in the set of jump times of ZS (resp. ZB), we
necessarily have θB,S + θS,T ≤ β (resp. θS,B + θB,T ≤ β). Moreover, Definition 2.3 i) implies
that p takes values in [0, 1], hence both bid and ask prices are [0, 1]-valued by definition. Therefore,∫ ·
0(v˜−a(Yu−, u))(dX
B,B
u −δθ
B,B
u du) is an FI -martingale (see [7, Chapter 1, T6]). Arguing similarly
with the other terms, the expected profit (2.1) can then be expressed as
δ EP
[∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yu− + δ, u))θB,Bu du+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yu− + 2δ, u))θB,Tu du+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yu−, u))θB,Su du
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yu− − δ, u))θS,Su du−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yu− − 2δ, u))θS,Tu du−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yu−, u))θS,Bu du
∣∣∣∣ v˜] .
This motivates us to define the following value function for the informed trader:
V (v˜, y, t) = sup
θi,j ; i∈{B,S},j∈{B,S,T}
δ EP
[∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yu− + δ, u))θB,Bu du+
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yu− + 2δ, u))θB,Tu +
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yu−, u))θB,Su du
−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yu− − δ, u))θS,Su du−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yu− − 2δ, u))θS,Tu du−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yu−, u))θS,Bu du
∣∣∣∣Yt = y, v˜] ,
for v˜ ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ [0, 1), and y ∈ δZ. The terminal value of V at 1 can be defined via the left limit
V (v˜, y, 1) := limt↑1 V (v˜, y, t). As we will see in Remark 3.3 below, V (v˜, y, 1) is not always zero.
Recall that Y = X + Z so that if one defines Y B = XB,B + XB,T + ZB − XS,B and Y S =
XS,S+XS,T +ZS−XB,S , then it is easy to see that (Y Bt − δ
∫ t
0 (β− θ
B,T
s − θ
S,B
s ) ds− δ
∫ t
0 θ
B,B
s ds−
2δ
∫ t
0 θ
B,T
s ds) and (Y St − δ
∫ t
0 (β − θ
S,T
s − θB,S) ds− δ
∫ t
0 θ
S,S
s ds− 2δ
∫ t
0 θ
S,T
s ds) are FI -martingales.
Thus, applying Ito’s formula to V (v˜, Yt, t) yields the following formal HJB equation (the variable v˜
is omitted in V for simplicity of notation) in view of the standard dynamic programming arguments:
0 = Vt + (V (y + δ, t) − 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t)) β
+ sup
θB,B≥0
[V (y + δ, t)− V (y, t) + (v˜ − p(y + δ, t)) δ] θB,B
+ sup
θB,T≥0
[V (y + 2δ, t) − V (y + δ, t) + δ(v˜ − p(y + 2δ, t))] θB,T
+ sup
θB,S≥0
[V (y, t)− V (y − δ, t) + (v˜ − p(y, t))δ] θB,S
+ sup
θS,S≥0
[V (y − δ, t)− V (y, t)− (v˜ − p(y − δ, t)) δ] θS,S
+ sup
θS,T≥0
[V (y − 2δ, t) − V (y − δ, t)− δ(v˜ − p(y − 2δ, t))] θS,T
+ sup
θS,B≥0
[V (y, t)− V (y + δ, t) − (v˜ − p(y, t))δ] θS,B, (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1).
(3.1)
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The optimiser (θi,j; i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,S, T}) in the previous equation is expected to be the
FI -intensities of the insider’s optimal strategy (Xi,j) when the order size is normalised to 1.
Notice that all maximisations in (3.1) are linear in θ. Therefore (3.1) reduces to the following
system:
Vt + (V (y + δ, t) − 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t)) β = 0,
V (y + δ, t)− V (y, t) + (v˜ − p(y + δ, t))δ ≤ 0,
V (y − δ, t)− V (y, t)− (v˜ − p(y − δ, t))δ ≤ 0, (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1).
(3.2)
Here the first inequality corresponds to the maximisation in θB,j; while the second inequality
corresponds to the maximisation in θS,j, j ∈ {B,S, T}. Let’s denote the optimisers in (3.1) with
(θi,j(y, t); (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1)), i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,S, T}. Observe that the first inequality in
(3.2) can be strict only if θB,B(y, t) = θB,S(y + δ, t) = θB,T (y − δ, t) = 0. Similarly, the second
inequality can be strict only if θS,S(y, t) = θS,B(y − δ, t) = θS,T (y + δ, t) = 0. We will see later that
the optimal θB,B and θB,S are never 0 for the high type insider meanwhile θS,S and θS,B are never
0 for the low type. Therefore the first inequality in (3.2) is actually an equality when v˜ = 1 and the
second inequality is an equality when v˜ = 0. Economically speaking, these equalities imply that at
every instant of time there is a non-zero probability that a high type insider will make a buy order
by either contributing to uninformed buy orders or canceling uninformed sell orders, and the low
type insider will do the opposite. Such actions are certainly reasonable for the insider. Indeed, a
high type insider will reveal her information gradually and keep the market price strictly less than
1. Recall that p is a martingale bounded by 1, so once it hits 1, it will be stopped at that level.
Therefore, since there is always a strictly positive difference between the true price, which is 1 in
this case, and the market price, the insider will always want to take advantage of this discrepancy
and buy with positive probability since the asset is undervalued by the market. The situation for
the low type is similar.
In view of the previous discussion, let’s consider the following system:
V Ht +
(
V H(y + δ, t) − 2V H(y, t) + V H(y − δ, t)
)
β = 0,
V H(y + δ, t)− V H(y, t) + (1− p(y + δ, t))δ = 0;
(HJB-H)
V Lt +
(
V L(y + δ, t) − 2V L(y, t) + V L(y − δ, t)
)
β = 0,
V L(y − δ, t) − V L(y, t) + p(y − δ, t)δ = 0,
(HJB-L)
for (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1). We expect that V H(y, t) = V (1, y, t) and V L(y, t) = V (0, y, t). The
next lemma will construct solutions to the above system and will be useful in solving the insider’s
optimisation problem. However, before the statement and the proof of this lemma we need to
introduce a class of functions satisfying certain boundary conditions and differential equations. We
will nevertheless denote them with p since, as we shall see later, they will appear in the equilibrium
as pricing rules for the market maker.
To this end, for each z ∈ δZ, let
(3.3) P z(y) :=
{
0, y < z
1, y ≥ z
,
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and define
(3.4) pz(y, t) := EP[P
z(Z1) |Zt = y].
Observe that Z/δ is the difference of two independent Poisson processes. The Markov property
implies4 that pz satisfies
pzt + (p
z(y + δ, t) − 2pz(y, t) + pz(y − δ, t)) β = 0, (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1),
pz(y, 1) = P z(y), y ∈ δZ.
(3.5)
Lemma 3.1. Let pz be defined by (3.4) for some fixed z ∈ δZ and define
H(y, 1) := δ
z−δ
δ∑
j= y
δ
(1−A(δj)), L(y, 1) := δ
y
δ∑
j= z
δ
B(δj), y ∈ δZ,
where A(y) := P z(y + δ), B(y) := P z(y − δ), and
∑n
j=m αj = −
∑m
j=n αj by convention whenever
m > n. Then, both H(·, 1) and L(·, 1) are nonnegative and the following equivalences hold:
H(y, 1) = 0⇐⇒ A(y) = 1⇐⇒ y ≥ z − δ, L(y, 1) = 0⇐⇒ B(y) = 0⇐⇒ y < z + δ.
Moreover,
H(y, t) := H(y, 1) + δβ
∫ 1
t
(pz(y + δ, u) − pz(y, u)) du and(3.6)
L(y, t) := L(y, 1) + δβ
∫ 1
t
(pz(y, u) − pz(y − δ, u)) du(3.7)
solve (HJB-H) and (HJB-L) respectively.
Proof. Statements regarding H(y, 1) and L(y, 1) directly follow from the definitions. We will next
show that H satsifies (HJB-H). Analogous statement for L can be proven similarly. First observe
that
H(y + δ, 1) −H(y, 1) = −δ + δA(y) = −δ + δP z(y + δ).
Thus,
H(y + δ, t)−H(y, t) = H(y + δ, 1) −H(y, 1) + δβ
∫ 1
t
(pz(y + 2δ, u) − 2pz(y + δ, u) + pz(y, u)) du
= δ (pz(y + δ, t)− 1) ,(3.8)
where (3.5) is used to obtain the last line. This proves the second equation in (HJB-H).
Next, it follows from the definition of H that
Ht(y, t) + δβ (p
z(y + δ, t) − pz(y, t)) = 0.
However, iterating (3.8) yields
H(y + δ, t) +H(y − δ, t) − 2H(y, t) = H(y + δ, t)−H(y, t)− (H(y, t)−H(y − δ, t))
= δ (pz(y + δ, t)− pz(y, t)) ,
and, hence, the claim. 
4The Markov property of Z implies that P(Z1 = z˜ |Zt = y) satisfies pt + (p(y + δ, t)− 2p(y, t) + p(y − δ, t))β = 0.
Therefore summing up the previous equation for different z induces that
∑
δZ∋z˜≥z
∂tP(Z1 = z˜ |Zt = y) is finite. Hence
Fubini’s theorem implies that the previous sum is exactly ∂tp
z and pz solves (3.5).
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Given a pricing rule, let us describe insider’s optimal strategies.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the market maker chooses pz as a pricing rule, where z is fixed and
pz is as defined in (3.4). Then, the following holds:
i) When v˜ = 1, (XB ,XS ;FI) is an optimal strategy if and only if Y1 ≥ z − δ and X
S,j = 0,
j = {B,S, T}.
ii) When v˜ = 0, (XB ,XS ;FI) is an optimal strategy if and only if Y1 < z + δ and X
B,j = 0,
j = {B,S, T}.
When the previous condition holds for v˜ = 1 (resp. v˜ = 0), v(1, y, t) = H(y, t) (resp. v(0, y, t) =
L(y, t)) for (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1].
Remark 3.3. Recall that V (v˜, y, 1) := limt↑1 V (v˜, y, t). Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 combined
implies that V (v˜, y, 1) ≥ 0. It is only zero when A(y) = 1 for the high type and B(y) = 0 for the
low type.
Proof. The statements for v˜ = 1 case will be proved. Similar arguments can be applied in order
to prove the statement regarding v˜ = 0. Fix (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1). For any admissible trading strat-
egy (Xi,j ; i ∈ {B,S}) and j ∈ {B,S, T} with associated FI -intensities (δθi,j ; i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈
{B,S, T}), applying Ito’s formula to H(Y·, ·) and utilizing Lemma 3.1, we obtain
H(Y1, 1)
= H(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
Ht(Yu−, u)du
+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− + δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) (β − θB,Tu − θ
S,B
u ) du+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− + δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) θB,Bu du
+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− + 2δ, t) −H(Yu−, u)) θB,Tu du
+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− − δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) (β − θS,T − θB,Su ) du+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− − δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) θS,Su du
+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− − 2δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) θS,Tu du+M1 −Mt
= H(y, t)
−
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− + δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) θS,Bu du+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− + δ, u)−H(Yu−, u)) θB,Bu du
+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− + 2δ, t) −H(Yu− + δ, u)) θB,Tu du
−
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− − δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) θB,Su du+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− − δ, u) −H(Yu−, u)) θS,Su du
+
∫ 1
t
(H(Yu− − 2δ, u) −H(Yu− − δ, u)) θS,Tu du+M1 −Mt
= H(y, t) + δ
∫ 1
t
(p(Yu− + δ, u)− 1) θB,Bu du+ δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu−, u)) θS,Su du
−δ
∫ 1
t
(p(Yu− + δ, u) − 1) θS,Bu du− δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu−, u)) θB,Su du
−δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu− + 2δ, u)) θB,Tu du+ δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu− − δ, u)) θS,Tu du+M1 −Mt.
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Here M contains
∫ ·
0(p(Yu− + δ, u) − 1)(dX
B,B
u − δθ
B,B
u du) and similar processes, which are all FI -
martingales due to the bounded integrand and the martingale property of Xi,j − δ
∫ ·
0 θ
i,j
u du for
i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,S, T} (see [7, Chapter 1, T6]). Thus, on [v˜ = 1]
δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu− + δ, u)) θB,Bu du+ δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu−, u)) θB,Su du+ δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu− + 2δ, u))θB,Tu du
−δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu− − δ, u)) θS,Su du− δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu−, u)) θS,Bu du− δ
∫ 1
t
(1− p(Yu− − 2δ, u)) θS,Tu du
= M1 −Mt −H(Y1, 1) +H(y, t)
−δ
∫ 1
t
(p(Yu−, u)− p(Yu− − δ, u)) θS,Su du− δ
∫ 1
t
(p(Yu− + δ, u) − p(Yu−, u)) θS,Bu du
−δ
∫ 1
t
(p(Yu− − δ, u) − p(Yu− − 2δ, u)) θS,Tu du.
Observe that the left side of the above equality is the wealth of the insider. Moreover, since
H ≥ 0 and p is strictly increasing in y, the expected wealth, conditioned on FIt , is maximised
when H(Y1, 1) = 0 P-a.s., θ
S,S, θS,T , and θS,B are identically zero. However, in view of Lemma 3.1,
H(Y1, 1) = 0 if and only if Y1 ≥ z − δ. 
We are now ready to state the conditions for equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4. (p,XB ,XS ,FI) is a Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium if there exists a yδ ∈ δZ such
that
i) [Y1 ≥ yδ] = [v˜ = 1] P-a.s.;
ii) p = pyδ which is defined by (3.4);
iii) (XB ,XS ;FI) is an admissible strategy such that Y = Z + XB − XS = Y B − Y S where
Y B/δ and Y S/δ are independent, FY -adapted Poisson processes with common intensity β,
and XS ≡ 0 (resp. XB ≡ 0) on [v˜ = 1] (resp. [v˜ = 0]).
Proof. Given the pricing rule p = pyδ , Proposition 3.2 implies that (XB ,XS ;FI) is optimal because
[Y1 ≥ yδ] = [v˜ = 1] P-a.s. and X
S ≡ 0 (resp. XB ≡ 0) on [v˜ = 1] (resp. [v˜ = 0]). Thus it remans
to show pyδ is a rational pricing rule given (XB ,XS ;FI). Indeed, since Y and Z have the same
distribution, it follows from (3.4) and the Markov property of Y that EP[v˜|F
Y
t ] = P[Y1 ≥ yδ|F
Y
t ] =
pyδ(Yt, t) for t ∈ [0, 1]. 
Remark 3.5. Theorem 3.4 iii) necessarily requires that XB,T ≡ 0 (resp. XS,T ≡ 0) on [v˜ = 1]
(resp. [v˜ = 0]) since it implies that the jumps occur with magnitude δ only. Recall from the proof
of Proposition 3.2 that this is not a requirement for optimality from the point of view of insider.
Rather, the insider chooses not to trade at the same time and in the same direction with the noise
traders in order to make it possible that there is a rational pricing rule that the market maker can
choose.
The equilibrium given in the above theorem is another manifestation of inconspicuous trade
theorem commonly observed in the insider trading literature (see, e.g., [14], [2], [6], etc.). Indeed,
when the insider is trading optimally in the above equilibrium, the distribution of the net order
process is the same as that of the net orders of the noise traders, i.e. the insider is able to hide her
trades among the noise trades. However, the private information is fully, albeit gradually, revealed
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to the public since v˜ ∈ FY1 . We will construct an admissible strategy satisfying conditions above
and show the existence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium in the following section.
Remark 3.6. Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 indicate that ‘bluffing’ strategies selling for the high-
type and buying for the low-type are sub-optimal. This is in contrast to the results in [4], which
use numeric computations to suggest such bluffing might be optimal.
4. Construction of a point process bridge
As seen in Theorem 3.4 we are interested in the construction of a process Y = Z + XB − XS
such that, in its natural filtration, Y = Y B − Y S such that Y B/δ and Y S/δ are independent
Poisson processes with intensity β. To this end, we will construct explicitly a process Y on some
(Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P) such that
(4.1) Y = ZB − ZS +XB II −X
S IIc ,
where I ∈ F0 with specified probability, X
B and XS are two point processes and Z/δ is F-adapted
and is the difference of two independent Poisson processes with intensity β. In particular, I is
independent of Z since Z has independent increments and Z0 = 0. The set I is to be associated
with the set [v˜ = 1]. In order to comply with the conditions of the equilibrium described in the
last section, we will further require [Y1 ≥ yδ] = I P-a.s. for a given suitable yδ. Since Y is expected
to have the same distribution as Z, the previous condition necessitates P(I) = P(Z1 ≥ yδ). During
the construction of the probability space and the process Y , we will take δ = 1 without loss of
generality since all the processes can be scaled by δ to construct the process we are after.
In order to construct such a process we first need to determine its intensity. Since Y would behave
like Z in its own filtration, we can view, in the sense of equality in distributions, the decomposition
in (4.1) as that of Z when its own filtration is initially enlarged with the random variable I[Z1≥y1].
Thus, the intensity of Y will be that of Z in this enlarged filtration.
Let (D([0, 1],Z),F1 , (F1t )t∈[0,1],P1) be the canonical space where D([0, 1],Z) is Z-valued ca`dla`g
functions, P1 is a probability measure under which ZB and ZS are independent Poisson processes
with intensities β, (F1t )t∈[0,1] is the minimal filtration generated by ZB and ZS satisfying the usual
conditions, and F1 =
∨
t∈[0,1]F
1
t . Let’s denote with (G
1
t )t∈[0,1] the filtration (F1t )t∈[0,1] enlarged
with the random variable I[Z1≥y1].
In order to find the G1-intensity of Z, we will use a standard enlargement of filtration argument
which can be found, e.g., in [15]. To this end, let h : [0, 1] × Z 7→ [0, 1] be the function defined by
(4.2) h(z, t) := P1[Z1 ≥ y1 |Zt = z].
Note that h is strictly positive on [0, 1) × Z. Moreover since (h(Zt, t))t∈[0,1] is an F1-martingale,
Ito’s formula yields
(4.3) ht(z, t) + β (h(z + 1, t) + h(z − 1, t)− 2h(z, t)) = 0, (t, z) ∈ [0, 1) × Z.
Lemma 4.1. The G1-intensities of ZB and ZS at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
I[Z1≥y1]β
h(Zt− + 1, t)
h(Zt−, t)
+ I[Z1<y1]β
1− h(Zt− + 1, t)
1− h(Zt−, t)
,
I[Z1≥y1]β
h(Zt− − 1, t)
h(Zt−, t)
+ I[Z1<y1]β
1− h(Zt− − 1, t)
1− h(Zt−, t)
,
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respectively.
Proof. We will only calculate the intensity for ZB . The intensity of ZS can be obtained similarly.
All expectations are taken under P1 throughout this proof. For s ≤ t < 1, take an arbitrary E ∈ F1s
and denote MBt := Z
B
t − βt. The definition of h and the F-martingale property of M
B imply
E
[
(MBt −M
B
s )IEI[Z1≥y1]
]
= E
[
(MBt −M
B
s )IEh(Zt, t)
]
= E
[
IE
(
〈MB , h(Z·, ·)〉t − 〈MB , h(Z·, ·)〉s
)]
= E
[
IE
∫ t
s
(h(Zr− + 1, r)− h(Zr−, r)) β dr
]
= E
[
IE
∫ t
s
I[Z1≥y1]
h(Zr− + 1, r)− h(Zr−, r)
h(Zr−, r)
β dr
]
.
Since P1(Z1 < δ |Zt = z) = 1− h(z, t), similar computations yield
E
[
(MBt −M
B
s )IEI[Z1<y1]
]
= E
[
IE
∫ t
s
I[Z1<y1]
h(Zr−, r)− h(Zr− + 1, r)
1− h(Zr−, r)
β dr
]
.
These computations imply that
MB −
∫ ·
0
I[Z1≥y1]
h(Zr− + 1, r)− h(Zr−, r)
h(Zr−, r)
β dr −
∫ ·
0
I[Z1<y1]
h(Zr−, r)− h(Zr− + 1, r)
1− h(Zr−, r)
β dr
defines a G1-martingale. Therefore the G1-intensity of ZB follows from ZBt =M
B
t + βt. 
In what follows, given I ∈ F0 and h as in (4.2) such that P(I) = h(0, 0), X
B on I and XS on
Ic will be constructed so that Y matches the intensities given in the above lemma. As a result,
Proposition 4.4 ensures I = [Y1 ≥ y1] P-a.s., which is what we are after. We will focus on the
construction of XB on I in what follows. By symmetry, XS on Ic can be constructed by the same
method but applied to −Z and −y1.
Recall that one of the goals of the process XB on I is to make sure that Y1 ends up at a value
larger than or equal to y1. In order to achieve this goal X
B will have to add some jumps in addition
to the jumps coming from ZB. However, this by itself won’t be enough since ZS will make Y jump
downward. Thus, XB will also need to cancel some of downwards jumps coming from ZS . Of
course, there are many ways in which XB achieves this goal. However, Y is required to have the
same distribution as Z. We will see in Proposition 4.4 that this distribution requirement will also
be satisfied once Y has the correct intensity given by Lemma 4.1.
As described above XB will consist of two componentsXB,B andXB,S , whereXB,B complements
jumps of ZB and XB,S cancels some jumps of ZS. Let’s denote by (τi)i≥1 the sequence of jump
times for the Y process we wish to construct. These stopping times will be constructed inductively
as follows. Given τi−1 < 1, τi is the minimum of the following three random times:
i) the next jump of ZB,
ii) the next jump of XB,B ,
iii) the next jump of ZS which is not cancelled by a jump of XB,S .
Here XB,B and XB,S are constructed so that Y B = ZB + XB,B and Y S = ZS − XB,S have the
required F-intensities on I. To achieve all these aims simultaneously, when the (i − 1)th jump of
Y happens before time 1, we will generate random variables νi and another sequence of Bernoulli
random variables (ξj,i)j≥1 to determine the next jump of Y . In the context of the informed trader
14 POINT PROCESS BRIDGES AND WEAK CONVERGENCE OF INSIDER TRADING MODELS
trying to make a decision, construction of XB corresponds to the following pattern: place a buy
order at time νi unless the next buy order from the uninformed trader arrives before νi and also
buy at every sell order of the uninformed trader until ξj,i = 1 for the first time.
We will now make this intuitive construction rigorous. In order to perform the subsequent
construction, we must assume that the filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P) is large enough
so that there exist I ∈ F0 with P(I) = h(0, 0) and two independent sequences of iid F-measurable
random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distribution on [0, 1], moreover (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1
are independent of both Z and I. These requirements can be easily satisfied by extending F0 and F
if necessary. The sequences (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 will be used to construct νi and (ξj,i)j≥1 in the last
paragraph. As for the filtration (Ft)t∈[0,1], we require that Z/δ, as the difference of two independent
Poisson processes with intensity β, is adapted to (Ft)t∈[0,1]. Since Z has independent increments
and Z0 = 0, Z is independent of I. We will make one more assumption on the filtration later during
the construction.
Denote by (σ+i )i≥1 and (σ
−
j )j≥1 jump times of Z
B and ZS , respectively. We set σ±i = ∞ when
σ±i > 1, since we are only interested in processes before time 1. In what follows, we will inductively
define two sequences of [0, 1] ∪ {∞}-valued random variables (τ+i )i≥1 and (τ
−
i )i≥1 on I. τ
+
i+1 (resp.
τ−i+1) will denote the first potential upward (resp. downward) jump of Y after time τi starting with
τ0 = 0. The process Y on I thus jumps at each τi := τ
+
i ∧ τ
−
i . In particular, when τ
+
i < τ
−
i ,
∆Yτi = ∆Y
B
τi = 1; when τ
−
i < τ
+
i , ∆Yτi = −∆Y
S
τi = −1.
Let’s start with the construction until the first jump of Y . Recall that, in view of Lemma 4.1,
we want to construct Y B (resp. Y S) so that its intensity until its first jump is given by
β
h(1, t)
h(0, t)
(
resp. β
h(−1, t)
h(0, t)
)
.
Hence τ1 is constructed to match this intensity.
To define τ+1 , set
f1(t) := 1− exp
(
β
∫ t
0
h(0, u) − h(1, u)
h(0, u)
du
)
, t ∈ [0, 1).
Since z 7→ h(z, t) is strictly increasing, f1 is strictly increasing. We consider the inverse function
f−11 (y) := inf{t ∈ [0, 1) : f(t) > y}, where the value is ∞ if the indicated set is empty. Now define
ν1 := f
−1
1 (η1) and τ
+
1 := ν1 ∧ σ
+
1 on I.
Then τ+1 is potentially the first jump time of Y
B . It follows from the definition of ν1 that P(τ
+
1 <
1) > 0. Such τ+1 is constructed to match the intensity of Y
B before the first jump of Y . On the
other hand, in order to define τ−1 , consider
(4.4) ξj,1 := I[
ζj≤
h(−1,σ−
j
)
h(0,σ−
j
)
, σ−j <1
] + I[σ−j ≥1] for j ≥ 1.
This indicator random variable determines whether the jth jump of ZS will be cancelled by an
opposite jump of XB,S . When ξj,1 = 0, which only happens when the j
th jump of ZS happens
before 1, this jump of ZS will be cancelled by a jump of XB,S . Such cancelation is performed at a
rate h(−1, σ−j )/h(0, σ
−
j ) so as to match the intensity of Y
S before the first jump of Y . Therefore,
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τ−1 , which is potentially the first negative jump, is the first jump time σ
−
j of Z
S which is not
cancelled. That is,
τ−1 := min{σ
−
j : ξj,1 = 1}.
Consequently, we define the first jump time of Y on I as
τ1 := τ
+
1 ∧ τ
−
1 .
This construction yields P(τ1 < 1) > 0. On [t ≤ τ1, I] with t ≤ 1, we define X
B,B and XB,S as
XB,Bt := I[ν1<σ+1 ]
I[τ+1 ≤t] and X
B,S
t :=
∞∑
j=1
(1− ξj,1) I[σ−j ≤t].
Now suppose that τi−1 with P(τi−1 < 1) > 0 and Yt for t ≤ τi−1 ∧ 1 have been defined. We will
define in this paragraph τi and Yt for t ∈ (τi−1 ∧ 1, τi ∧ 1]. To this end, when τi−1 < 1, consider the
random function
fi(t) := 1− exp
(
λ
∫ t
τi−1
h(Yu−, u)− h(Yu− + 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
du
)
, t ∈ [τi−1, 1).
Since fi is strictly increasing, the inverse function f
−1
i (y) := inf{t ∈ [τi−1, 1) : f(t) > y} is well-
defined. When τi−1 ≥ 1, set f−1i (y) =∞. Now define
νi := f
−1
i (ηi) and τ
+
i := νi ∧ σ
+
ZBτi−1+1
on I.
To ease notation, we denote σ˜+i := σ
+
ZBτi−1+1
, where ZBτi−1 counts the number of Z
B jumps until
τi−1. Hence σ˜+i indicates which jumps of Z
B could be the next jump of Y B after τi−1. Similarly,
define
ξj,i := I[
ζj≤
h(Yτi−1−1,σ
−
j
)
h(Yτi−1 ,σ
−
j
)
, τi−1≤σ−j <1
] + I[σ−j ≥1],
and set
τ−i := min{σ
−
j > τi−1 : ξj,i = 1}.
The i-th jump of Y on I is then defined as
τi := τ
+
i ∧ τ
−
i .
Since P(τi−1 < 1) > 0, the above construction yields P(τi < 1) > 0. The increment of XB,B and
XB,S on (τi−1 ∧ 1, τi ∧ 1] are defined as
XB,Bt −X
B,B
τi−1 = I[σ˜+i >νi]
I[τ+i ≤t] and X
B,S
t −X
B,S
τi−1 =
∞∑
j=1
(1− ξj,i) I[τi−1≤σ−j ≤t],
for t ∈ (τi−1 ∧ 1, τi ∧ 1].
This completes the construction of XB since XB = XB,B + XB,S and we thus obtain the
decomposition (4.1) on I for t ∈ [0, 1∧ limi→∞ τi]. As mentioned earlier, the construction on Ic can
be performed analogously.
Remark 4.2. A natural question on whether τ := limi→∞ τi ≥ 1 or not arises at this point. Observe
that since ZB and ZS are finite processes, P(τ < 1, I) > 0 implies that there are infinitely many
jumps in XB,B so that limi→∞ Y Bτi = ∞, in which case we define Y
B = ∞ after τ . A similar
explosion on Ic will result in Y becoming −∞. However, we will see in Proposition 4.4 that Y is
P-a.s. a finite process and, thus, τ ≥ 1, P-a.s..
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In order to be able to perform the construction above on (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P), in addition to the
assumptions already imposed on the filtration, we add one more assumption that (Ft)t∈[0,1] is right
continuous and complete such that XB and XS are F-adapted and (τ+i )i≥1, (τ
−
i )i≥1 and (νi)i≥1
are F-stopping times. This completes our assumptions on (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P). We now return to
verify that the process Y just constructed satisfies
i) [Y1 ≥ y1] = I, P-a.s., and
ii) In its own filtration Y = Y B − Y S where Y B and Y S are FY -adapted independent Poisson
processes with intensity β.
We first establish that the F-intensity of Y is of the same form as the G1-intensity of Z computed
in Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.3. The F-intensities of Y B and Y S at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
IIβ
h(Yt− + 1, t)
h(Yt−, t)
+ IIcβ
1− h(Yt− + 1, t)
1− h(Yt−, t)
and IIβ
h(Yt− − 1, t)
h(Yt−, t)
+ IIcβ
1− h(Yt− − 1, t)
1− h(Yt−, t)
.
Proof. We will calculate the F-intensities of Y B and Y S on I. Their intensities on Ic can be
similarly verified. First, observe that the construction of νi implies that on I and [τi−1 < 1]
P
(
νi > t ∨ τi−1 | Fτi−1
)
= P
(
ηi > fi(t ∨ τi−1) | Fτi−1
)
= exp
(
β
∫ t∨τi−1
τi−1
h(Yu−, u)− h(Yu− + 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
du
)
, for t ∈ [0, 1).
(4.5)
We will make repeated use of (4.5) in order to obtain the F-intensity of Y B on I. To this end, note
that [τ+i > t ≥ τi−1, I] = [σ˜
+
i > t, νi > t, t ≥ τi−1, I]. Therefore we have on [t ≥ τi−1, I] that
P(τ+i > t | Fτi−1) = P(σ˜
+
i > t | Fτi−1)P(νi > t | Fτi−1)
= P(Zt = Zτi−1 | Fτi−1) exp
(
β
∫ t
τi−1
h(Yu−, u)− h(Yu− + 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
du
)
= exp(−β(t− τi−1)) exp
(
β
∫ t
τi−1
h(Yu−, u)− h(Yu− + 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
du
)
,
(4.6)
where the first line is due to the independence of ZB and νi and the last line follows from the strong
Markov property of ZB and the fact that τi−1 is an F-stopping time.
It is well-known (see, e.g. Proposition 3.1 in [11]) that the F-intensity of Y B on I is given by
P(τ+i ∈ dt | Fτi−1)
P(τ+i > t | Fτi−1)dt
, t ∈ (τi−1, τi].
Utilising (4.3) and (4.6), it follows from direct calculations and the observation that Yt− is constant
in (τi−1, τi] that the above intensity is indeed
β
h(Yt− + 1, t)
h(Yt−, t)
on I for t ∈ (τi−1, τi].
To calculate the intensity of Y S on I and in the time interval (τi−1, τi], we will treat the evolution
of Y S as that of a marked point process with points (σ−j ∨ τi−1)j≥1 and marks (ξj,i)j≥1. Let
σ˜−i := σ
−
ZSτi−1+1
and ξ˜i be the associated mark. Define Gi(dt, 1) = P
(
σ˜−i ∈ dt, ξ˜i = 1 | Fτi−1
)
and
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Hi(dt) = P(σ˜
−
i ∈ dt | Fτi−1). It then follows from Proposition 3.1 in [11] that the intensity of Y
S at
t ∈ (τi−1, τi] is
Gi(dt, 1)
Hi([t,∞])dt
=
EP
[
I[σ˜−i ∈dt]P(ξ˜i = 1 | Fσ˜−i )
∣∣Fτi−1]
P(σ˜−i > t | Fτi−1)dt
=
h(Yt− − 1, t)
h(Yt−, t)
P(σ˜−i ∈ dt | Fτi−1)
P(σ˜−i > t | Fτi−1)dt
=
h(Yt− − 1, t)
h(Yt−, t)
β,
due to the strong Markov property of ZS. This verifies the intensity of Y S on I. 
We are now ready to prove that our construction as desired.
Proposition 4.4. The process (Yt; t ∈ [0, 1]) as constructed above satisfies the following properties:
i) [Y1 ≥ y1] = I, P-a.s.;
ii) Y B and Y S are independent Poisson processes with intensity β with respect to the natural
filtration (FYt )t∈[0,1] of Y . In particular, Y is finite P-a.s. over [0, 1].
iii) E[XB1 ] and E[X
S
1 ] are finite. Hence the constructed strategy (X
B ,XS ;FI) is admissible.
Proof. To verify that Y satisfies the desired properties, let us introduce an auxiliary process (ℓt)t∈[0,1)
via
ℓt := II
h(0, 0)
h(Yt, t)
+ IIc
1− h(0, 0)
1− h(Yt, t)
, t ∈ [0, 1).
The construction of Y S on I (resp. Y B on Ic) implies that there are only a finite number of jumps
before a fixed time t < 1. Therefore Yt > −∞ on I (resp. Yt <∞ on I
c) for t ∈ [0, 1), which implies
h(Yt, t) > 0 on I (resp. h(Yt, t) < 1 on I
c) for t ∈ [0, 1). As a result, (ℓt)t∈[0,1) is a well-defined
positive process with ℓ0 = 1. To prove the first statement, we first show that ℓ is a positive F-local
martingale on [0, 1). To this end, Ito’s formula yields that
dℓt = IIℓt−
[
h(Yt−, t)− h(Yt− + 1, t)
h(Yt− + 1, t)
dMBt +
h(Yt−, t)− h(Yt− − 1, t)
h(Yt− − 1, t)
dMSt
]
+IIcℓt−
[
h(Yt− + 1, t) − h(Yt−, t)
1− h(Yt− + 1, t)
dMB,ct +
h(Yt− − 1, t)− h(Yt−, t)
1− h(Yt− − 1, t)
dMS,ct
]
, t ∈ [0, 1).
Here
MB = IIY
B − IIβ
∫ ·
0
h(Yu− + 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
du, MS = IIY
S − IIβ
∫ ·
0
h(Yu− − 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
du,
MB,c = IIcY
B − IIcβ
∫ ·
0
1− h(Yu− + 1, u)
1− h(Yu−, u)
du, MS,c = IIcY
S − IIcβ
∫ ·
0
1− h(Yu− − 1, u)
1− h(Yu−, u)
du
are all F-local martingales. Define ζ+n = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] : Yt = n} and ζ
−
n = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] : Yt = −n}.
Consider the sequence of stopping times (ηn)n≥1, where
ηn :=
(
IIζ
−
n + IIcζ
+
n
)
∧ (1− 1/n).
It follows from the definition of h that h(Yt, t) on I (resp. 1− h(Yt, t) on I
c) is bounded away from
zero uniformly in t ∈ [0, ηn]. This implies that ℓ
ηn is bounded, hence ℓηn is a F-martingale. The
construction of Y S on I (resp. Y B on Ic) yields limn→∞ ηn = 1. Therefore, ℓ is a positive F-local
martingale, hence also a supermartingale, on [0, 1).
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Define ℓ1 := limt→1 ℓt, which exists and is finite due to Doob’s supermartingale convergence
theorem. This implies h(Y1−, 1) > 0 on I (resp. 1−h(Y1−, 1) > 0 on Ic). Recall that Y S on I (resp.
Y B on Ic) does not jump at time 1 almost surely. Therefore h(Y1, 1) > 0 on I (resp. 1−h(Y1, 1) > 0
on Ic), which yields Y1 ≥ y1 on I (resp. Y1 < y1 on I
c).
Let us now prove the second statement for Y B . The statement for Y S can be shown similarly.
In view of the F-intensity of Y B calculated in Lemma 4.3, one has that, for each i ≥ 1
Y B·∧τi∧1 − β
(
II
∫ ·∧τi∧1
0
h(Yu− + 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
du+ IIc
∫ ·∧τi∧1
0
1− h(Yu− + 1, u)
1− h(Yu−, u)
du
)
is an F-martingale. We will show in the next paragraph that, when stopped at τi ∧ 1, Y
B is a
Poisson process in FY by showing that (Y Bt∧τi − β(t ∧ τi))t∈[0,1] is a F
Y -martingale–recall that τi
is an FY -stopping time. This in turn will imply that Y B is a Poisson process with intensity β on
[0, τ ∧ 1) where τ = limi→∞ τi is the explosion time. Since Poisson process does not explode, this
will further imply Y Bτ∧1 <∞ and, therefore, τ ≥ 1, P-a.s. in view of Remark 4.2.
We proceed by projecting the above martingale into FY to see that
Y B − β
∫ ·
0
[
P(I | FYu )
h(Yu− + 1, u)
h(Yu−, u)
+ P(Ic | FYu )
1− h(Yu− + 1, u)
1− h(Yu−, u)
]
du
is a FY -martingale when stopped at τi ∧ 1. Therefore, it remains to show that, for almost all
t ∈ [0, 1), on [t ≤ τi]
P(I | FYt )
h(Yt− + 1, t)
h(Yt−, t)
+ P(Ic | FYt )
1− h(Yt− + 1, t)
1− h(Yt−, t)
= 1.
In the remaining of the proof, we will show that on [t ≤ τi]
(4.7) P(I | FYt ) = h(Yt, t) and P(I
c | FYt ) = 1− h(Yt, t), for t ∈ [0, 1).
The statement then follows since Yt 6= Yt− only for countably many times.
We have seen that (ℓu∧τi)u∈[0,t] is a strictly positive F-martingale for each i. Define a probability
measure Qi ∼ P on Ft via dQ
i/dP|Ft = ℓτi∧t. It follows from a simple application of Girsanov’s
theorem that (Y B· ) and (Y S· ) are Poisson processes when stopped at τi ∧ t and with intensity β
under Qi. Therefore, they are independent from I under Qi. Then, for t < 1 we obtain from Bayes’
formula that
I[u≤τi∧t]P(I | F
Y
u ) = I{u≤τi∧t}
EQi
[
IIℓ
−1
u | F
Y
u
]
EQi
[
ℓ−1u | FYu
]
= I[u≤τi∧t]
EQi
[
II
h(Yu,u)
h(0,0) | F
Y
u
]
EQi
[
II
h(Yu,u)
h(0,0) + IIc
1−h(Yu,u)
1−h(0,0) | F
Y
u
]
= I[u≤τi∧t]h(Yu, u),
(4.8)
where the third identity follows from the aforementioned independence of Y and I under Qi along
with the fact that Qi does not change the probability of F0 measurable events, so that Q
i(I) =
P(I) = h(0, 0). As a result, (4.7) follows from (4.8) after sending i→∞.
Finally, since Y B and Y S are Poisson processes in FY and they do not jump simultaneously
by their construction, they are independent (see [9, Proposition 5.3]). Since Y B and Y S are in-
dependent Poisson processes, it also follows E[XB1 ] < ∞. Indeed, since X
B
1 IIc = 0, we have
POINT PROCESS BRIDGES AND WEAK CONVERGENCE OF INSIDER TRADING MODELS 19
E[XB1 ] = E[X
B
1 II ] = E[(Y
B
1 − Z
B
1 +X
B,S)II ] ≤ E[Y
B
1 ] + E[Z
B
1 ] + E[Z
S
1 ] < ∞. Similar arguments
also show that E[XS1 ] <∞. Hence, the constructed strategy (X
B ,XS ;FI) is admissible. 
5. Existence and convergence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria
In view of the results of Section 4, we can now show that a Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium exists
for the market model under consideration.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 are two sequences of independent F-measurable
random variables uniformly distributed over [0, 1] that are independent from each other, Z and v˜.
If there exists a yδ such that
P(Z1 ≥ yδ) = P(v˜ = 1),
and FI is the right continuous augmentation of (σ(v˜, Zs, ηi, ζi; s ≤ t, i ≥ 1))t∈[0,1] with the P-null
sets, then there exists a Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3.4, an equilibrium exists if Y satisfies the conditions stated in Theorem
3.4 and the high type (resp. low type) insider never sells (resp. buys). However, the insider can
use the uniform random variables available in her filtration to perform the construction described
in Section 4 so that Y satisfies the desired properties, due to Proposition 4.4, without having to
sell (resp. buy) when high type (resp. low type). 
In the remainder of this section we will analyse what happens when the trade size becomes small
(δ → 0) and the noise trades arrive more frequently (β →∞). A similar convergence has also been
studied by Back and Baruch in [4] who have established that the limiting economy can be described
by a Kyle-Back equilibrium. We would like to mention at this point that Back and Baruch have
proved their convergence results under some extra hypotheses on the convergence of value functions
which may be hard to verify. As we shall see below, we will verify the convergence via a weak
convergence approach and we do not need any extra assumptions in addition to the ones which
have already been assumed. Before performing a weak convergence analysis of Glosten-Milgrom
equilibria, whose existence is justified by Theorem 5.1, let’s first briefly describe what we mean by
a Kyle-Back equilibrium.
The continuous-time model of Kyle [14], which was later extended by Back [2], studies the
equilibrium pricing of a risky asset whose liquidation value at time 1 is given by v˜. In this model,
the cumulative noise trades is modelled by a Brownian motion, denoted with W , independent of
v˜. The risk neutral insider knows the true liquidation value from the beginning and competition
among the risk neutral market makers forces them to quote prices as conditional expectations of
v˜ based on their information. The price is again set in a Markovian manner, i.e. there exists a
function p0 : R 7→ [0, 1] so that the market price is given by p0(Yt, t) at time t where Y is, as before,
the cumulative demand at time t.
Let Ω0 = D([0, 1],R) be the space of R-valued ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1] with the coordinate
process Y 0 and P0 be the Wiener measure. In view of the results of [2] and [8], the equilibrium
price of the risky asset in this economy is given by
(5.1) p0(y, t) := P0y
[
Y 01−t ≥ y0
]
,
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where
y0 := Φ
−1(1− P(v˜ = 1)),
and Φ(·) =
∫ ·
−∞
1√
2π
e−x
2/2dx. The equilibrium demand satisfies the SDE
(5.2) Y =W + I[v˜=1]
∫ ·
0
∂y log p
0(Ys, s) ds+ I[v˜=0]
∫ ·
0
∂y log(1− p
0(Ys, s)) ds.
Remark 5.2. Strictly speaking, the equilibrium price (5.1) and demand (5.2) in this economy do
not follow directly from the results of [2] and [8] since in their framework v˜ has a continuous
distribution. However, if one follows the arguments for the description of equilibrium given in [8],
it follows that in equilibrium the insider trades so that v˜ = p0(Y1, 1) and Y is a Brownian motion
in its own filtration. This immediately gives (5.1) as the equilibrium price, since the price follows
a martingale with respect to the filtration of the market maker, which is the same as the filtration
generated by Y . Moreover, the same characterisation gives that the SDE satisfied by Y with respect
to the filtration of the insider is the same as the SDE satisfied by a standard Brownian motion when
its natural filtration is initially enlarged with the random variable corresponding to its time 1 value
being larger than y0. The standard arguments contained in, e.g. Section 1.3 of [15], gives (5.2).
In view of the well-known results on the weak convergence of a sequence of difference of Poisson
processes to Brownian motion (see, e.g., Theorem 5.4 in Chapter 6 of [10]), it is easy to see that
the cumulative demand of noise traders in a Kyle-Back model can be considered as the weak limit
of noise demands in a sequence of Glosten-Milgrom models. Based on this observation it is natural
to ask whether the Kyle-Back equilibrium is the weak limit of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria.
We now return to give an affirmative answer to this question. More precisely, we consider
the convergence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria to the Kyle-Back equilibrium described by (5.1) and
(5.2). In what follows, the superscript δ ≥ 0 indicates the trade size associated to different processes,
probabilities, random variables, and functions.
Let (Ωδ,Fδ , (Fδt )t∈[0,1],Pδ)δ≥0 be a sequence of probability spaces on which the Glosten-Milgrom
models of different order sizes are defined. When δ > 0, Ωδ = D([0, 1], δZ) is the space of δZ-valued
ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1] with the coordinate process Y δ, (Fδt )t∈[0,1] is the minimal right continuous
and complete filtration generated by Y δ, and Pδ for δ > 0 is the probability measure under which
Y δ is the difference of two independent Poisson processes with the same intensity βδ. P0 is the
Wiener measure as mentioned in the earlier paragraphs.
To construct a sequence of pricing rules in Glosten-Milgrom equilibria which converges to the
Kyle-Back equilibrium, set
yδ := inf{y ∈ δZ, P
δ(Y δ1 ≤ y) ≥ 1− P(v˜ = 1)}, for δ > 0,
and denote pyδ , defined in (3.4), by pδ for simplicity. To ensure the existence of Glosten-Milgrom
equilibria with pricing rules (pδ)δ>0, we introduce a sequence of Bernoulli random variables (v˜
δ)δ>0
whose distribution is
(5.3) P(v˜δ = 1) = Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ).
These (v˜δ)δ>0 will be the liquidation values of the risky asset in the sequence of Glosten-Milgrom
models which converges to the Kyle-Back model.
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Theorem 5.3. For any v˜ satisfying P(v˜ = 1) ∈ (0, 1), there exists a sequence of admissible strategies
(XB,δ ,XS,δ)δ>0 such that, for each δ > 0, (p
δ,XB,δ ,XS,δ) is a Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium whose
fundamental value of the risky asset is v˜δ.
When the intensity of Poisson process is given by βδ = (2δ2)−1 in the Glosten-Milgrom model,
as δ → 0, the sequence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria converge to the Kyle-Back equilibrium in the
following sense:
i) The bid and ask prices in these Glosten-Milgrom equilibria converge to the price in the
Kyle-Back equilibrium. That is, limδ↓0 aδ(y, t) = limδ↓0 bδ(y, t) = limδ↓0 pδ(y, t) = p0(y, t)
for (y, t) ∈ R × [0, 1). Moreover, the corresponding market depths in the Glosten-Milgrom
equilibria converges to the market depth in the Kyle-Back equilibrium:
lim
δ↓0
1
δ
(
aδ(y, t)− pδ(y, t)
)
= lim
δ↓0
1
δ
(
pδ(y, t)− bδ(y, t)
)
= ∂yp
0(y, t), for (y, t) ∈ R× [0, 1).
ii) Let Y 0,H and Y 0,L be the solutions to the following two SDEs, respectively,
dYt =
∂yp
0(Yt, t)
p0(Yt, t)
dt+ dWt and dYt = −
∂yp
0(Yt, t)
1− p0(Yt, t)
dt+ dWt, t ∈ [0, 1),
where W is a Brownian motion under (Ω,F0, (F0t )t∈[0,1],P0). Define
B0· =
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0,Ht , t)
p0(Y 0,Ht , t)
dt and S0· =
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0,Lt , t)
1− p0(Y 0,Lt , t)
dt.
Then,
• When v˜ = 1, XB,δ
L
→ B0;
• When v˜ = 0, XS,δ
L
→ S0,
where
L
→ represents the convergence in law.
iii) (p0, Y 0) satisfies (5.1) and (5.2) where
Y 0 = I[v=1]Y
0,H + I[v=0]Y
0,L.
As such, p0 and Y 0 are the equilibrium price and demand in the Kyle-Back equilibrium,
respectively.
The above theorem tells us that Kyle-Back model with Bernoulli distributed v˜ can be approxi-
mated by a sequence of Glosten-Milgrom models whose risky asset fundamental price converges to
v˜ in distribution. Since there is no bid-ask spread in the Kyle-Back equilibrium, the above conver-
gence results in particular tell us that the bid-ask spread gets smaller and vanish in the limit as the
frequency of noise trades increase. Moreover the rate the convergence is O(δ).
To show the desired convergence results contained in the theorem above, let us first prove the
convergence in law of the cumulative order processes as seen in the filtration, say F
δ
, with respect
to which Xδ and Zδ are adapted and v˜ ∈ F
δ
0. Note that this filtration is smaller than the filtration
that is assumed to be contained in the insider’s filtration in Theorem 5.1, however, it contains
all the relevant processes and random variables describing insider’s strategy and the informational
advantage. Moreover, it will be enough to limit ourselves to these filtrations in order to prove
Theorem 5.3. Recall from Section 4 that, for each δ > 0, the distribution of the cumulative order
process in F
δ
is the same as the distribution of Y δ conditioned on Y δ1 ≥ yδ or Y
δ
1 < yδ. Here Y
δ/δ
is the difference of two Poisson processes in its own filtration.
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Lemma 5.4. Let βδ = (2δ2)−1. We have
Law(Y δ |Y δ1 ≥ yδ)⇒ Law(Y
0,H) and Law(Y δ |Y δ1 < yδ)⇒ Law(Y
0,L), as δ → 0,
where Y 0,H and Y 0,L are defined in Theorem 5.3 ii) and ⇒ represents the weak convergence of
probability measures.
Proof. The first convergence will be proved. The second convergence can be shown similarly. Since
βδ = (2δ2)−1, it follows from [10, Theorem 5.4 in Chapter 6] that Pδ ⇒ P0 and, in particular,
Law(Y δ1 ) ⇒ Law(Y
0
1 ). Observe that yδ is the (1 − P(v˜ = 1))
th quantile of the distribution for Y δ1
and the distribution of Y 01 is continuous. It then follows
(5.4) lim
δ↓0
yδ = y0.
Meanwhile the conditional distribution Law(Y δ |Y δ1 ≥ yδ) is defined via
(5.5) Pδ,H(A) :=
Pδ(A,Y δ1 ≥ yδ)
Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ)
, for A ∈ Fδ.
We will show Pδ,H ⇒ P0,H as δ ↓ 0. This statement will follow once we show the finite dimensional
distributions of Y δ converge weakly to the finite dimensional distributions of Y 0, and (Pδ,H)δ>0 is
tight (see e.g. [12, VI.3.20]). We will prove both of these conditions using the already observed
convergence of Pδ to P0.
To this end, we will first establish the the convergence of Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ) to P
0(Y 01 ≥ y0). Indeed,
due to (5.4), there exists a sufficiently small δǫ such that yδ ≥ y0 − ǫ for δ ≤ δǫ. Thus,
Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ) ≤ P
δ(Y δ1 ≥ y0 − ǫ)→ P
0(Y 01 ≥ y0 − ǫ), as δ ↓ 0,
where the convergence follows from Law(Y δ1 )⇒ Law(Y
0
1 ) and the fact that the distribution of Y
0
1
is continuous at y0 − ǫ. Then the previous inequality yields lim supδ↓0 Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ) ≤ P
0(Y 01 ≥ y0)
since the choice of ǫ is arbitrary. Combining the previous inequality with lim infδ↓0 Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ) ≥
P0(Y 01 ≥ y0), which can be similarly proved, we obtain
(5.6) lim
δ↓0
Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ) = P
0(Y 01 ≥ y0) = P(v˜ = 1) > 0.
In order to prove the convergence of the finite dimensional distributions of Y δ, we are first going
to show
lim
δ↓0
EP
δ,H
[
f(Y δt1 , · · · , Y
δ
tn)
]
= EP
0,H [
f(Y 0t1 , · · · , Y
0
tn)
]
,
for arbitrary bounded continuous function f : Rn → R and 0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · < tn ≤ 1. However, similar
arguments as those employed in the last paragraph yield
lim
δ↓0
EP
δ
[
f(Y δt1 , · · · , Y
δ
tn) I[Y δ1 ≥yδ]
]
= EP
0
[
f(Y 0t1 , · · · , Y
0
tn) I[Y 01 ≥δ0]
]
.
The claim then follows from combining the previous convergence with (5.5) and (5.6).
To verify the tightness of (Pδ,H)δ>0, it is equivalent to prove the following two conditions (see
[12, Theorem VI.3.21]):
(1) for any ǫ > 0, there exist δǫ and K ∈ R with
Pδ,H
(
sup
0≤t≤1
|Y δt | > K
)
≤ ǫ, for all δ ≤ δǫ;
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(2) for any ǫ > 0 and η > 0, there exists δǫ,η and θǫ,η such that
Pδ,H
(
w′1(Y
δ, θǫ,η) ≥ η
)
≤ ǫ, for all δ ≤ δǫ,η.
We refer reader to [12, Chapter VI, Section 1a] for the definition of w′1.
Observe that, since Pδ ⇒ P0, (Pδ)δ>0 is tight which implies that the two conditions above hold when
Pδ,H is replaced by Pδ. Moreover, if A stands for the event [sup0≤t≤1 |Y δt | > K] or [w′1(Y
δ, θǫ,η) ≥ η],
(5.5) along with (5.6) yields
Pδ,H(A) =
Pδ(A,Y δ1 ≥ yδ)
Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ)
≤
Pδ(A)
Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ)
≤
ǫ
Pδ(Y δ1 ≥ yδ)
≤
2ǫ
P0(Y 01 ≥ y0)
for sufficiently small δ,
which confirms the aforementioned conditions for Pδ,H .
Finally, it remains to verify that P0,H is the law of Y 0,H . To this end, note that P0,H is the law
of a Brownian motion conditioned on its time 1 value being larger than y0. A standard calculation
using the well-known h-transform technique gives the following semimartingale decomposition of
Y 0 under P0,H :
Y 0t =
∫ t
0
∂yp
0(Y 0u , u)
p0(Y 0u , u)
du+ W˜t, t ∈ [0, 1),
where W˜ is a P0,H -Brownian motion. Since ∂yp
0/p0 is locally Lipschitz, the previous SDE has a
unique solution in law, therefore P0,H must be the law of Y 0,H . 
We are now ready to prove the convergence results.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. The existence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria follows from (5.3) and Theorem
5.1 directly. We will prove the statements on convergence in what follows.
i) First note that limδ↓0 pδ(y, t) = p0(y, t) follows from the argument which leads to (5.6).
Moreover, this immediately implies the convergence of bid and ask prices as given in i) since
aδ(y, t) = pδ(y + δ, t) and bδ(y, t) = pδ(y − δ, t). To verify the convergence of the market
depth, observe that
aδ(y, t)− pδ(y, t) = Pδy+δ[Y
δ
1−t ≥ yδ]− P
δ
y[Y
δ
1−t ≥ yδ] = P
δ
0[Y
δ
1−t = yδ − y − δ]
= P
[
Y 1−t =
yδ − y − δ
δ
]
,
where Y 1−t is the difference of two independent Poisson random variables with the common
parameter (1− t)β = (1− t)(2δ2)−1 under P. Recall that the difference of two independent
Poissons has the so-called Skellam distribution (see [16]). Thus, P(Y 1−t = k) = e−2µI|k|(2µ),
where I|k|(·) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind and µ = (1 − t)(2δ2)−1. As
a result
1
δ
(aδ(y, t)− pδ(y, t)) =
1
δ
P
[
Y 1−t =
yδ − y − δ
δ
]
=
1
δ
exp
(
−
1− t
δ2
)
I∣∣∣ yδ−y−δ
δ
∣∣∣
(
1− t
δ2
)
→
1√
2π(1 − t)
exp
(
−
(y0 − y)
2
2(1− t)
)
, as δ ↓ 0.
Here the convergence follows from (5.4) and [1, Theorem 2], which states that the density of
the Skellam distribution converges to the density of the normal after appropriate rescaling.
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Similar argument shows that (pδ(y, t) − bδ(y, t))/δ converges to the same function. This
establishes the convergence of market depths given in i) since ∂yp
0(y, t) is exactly the normal
density above.
ii) Recall from Section 4 and the discussion preceding Lemma 5.4 that, for each δ > 0, the
distribution of the cumulative order process in F
δ
on the set [v˜ = 1] (resp. [v˜ = 0]) is the
same as the distribution of Y δ conditioned on Y δ1 ≥ yδ (resp. Y
δ
1 < yδ). However, Lemma
5.4 has already shown that Law(Y δ |Y δ1 ≥ yδ)⇒ Law(Y
0,H), where Y 0,H = B0+W . Since
Law(Zδ)⇒ Law(W ) as δ ↓ 0, it follows from [12, Proposition VI.1.23] that Law(XB,δ)⇒
Law(B0) as δ ↓ 0. The convergence of Law(XS,δ) can be similarly proved.
iii) This now follows from Remark 5.2.

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